

Safe Automotive soFtware architEcture (SAFE)


Dr. Stefan Voget

Agenda




SAFE

makes Functional safety safe



Safe Motivation

Recalls for safety-related components



October 2013

November 2013


July 2014



Safe Motivation

Recalls for safety-related components

Annual vehicles affected



October
2013

➤ Toyota recalls
900.000
vehicles

➤ Constructional
flaw

Water can leak from the air conditioning and drip on control modules for airbags, **which can cause** airbags to set off or lose their function


October 2013

November 2013

July 2014




Recalls for safety-related components



Fuse can melt, causing both lighting circuits to malfunction, leaving the car unlighted

November 2013

- VW recalls 800.000 Tiguan
- Possible dangerous safety fuse



October 2013


November 2013

July 2014



Safe Motivation


Recalls for safety-related components




Safe Motivation

Starting point – 2011


- Automotive Functional Safety standard published November 2011
- 1st mandatory interpretation of general standard IEC61508 for automotive industry




Scope of SAFE - ISO26262 Development Lifecycle




Scope of SAFE - ISO26262 Development Lifecycle



Scope of SAFE - ISO26262 Development Lifecycle




Scope of SAFE - ISO26262 Development Lifecycle



Safe Motivation

Recalls for safety-related components



Scope of SAFE - ISO26262 Development Lifecycle

Challenge

- ISO26262 defines more than 1000 requirements
- Challenge for automotive industry:
 - Reach acceptable risk level by ensuring process compliance with ISO26262

Approach

- Provide model based development process that integrates functional-safety

Solution of

- Architecture description language
- Tools
- Methods and application Rules



Agenda

SAFE
motivation

SAFE

makes Functional safety safe


**SAFE in
the project
landscape**

SAFE
modeling



SAFE in the project landscape

Who did it?




Start: 01.07.2011

End: 31.12.2014




SAFE in the project landscape

How did we work with others?



SAFE in the project landscape

Influence of SAFE



Agenda

SAFE
motivation

SAFE

makes Functional safety safe


SAFE in
the project
landscape

**SAFE
modeling**




Content

- **Open Meta-model**
 - **Scope**
 - Structure
 - Exemplified insight





ISO26262




SAFE – Safety Goal Modeling



SAFE Modeling

Hazard and Risk Analysis



From the item „service brake“ the safety goal „Do not apply brake force unless driver brakes“ is derived.

Functional safety concept



ISO26262

3-7 Hazard analysis and risk assessment

3-8 Functional safety concept

4-6 Specification of technical safety requirements

5-6 Specification of hardware safety requirements

6-6 Specification of software safety requirements

Specification of the functional safety requirements ... and their interaction necessary to achieve the safety goals.

SAFE - Functional safety concept

Safety Goal

Safe State

ASIL

A	B	C	D
---	---	---	---

Functional Safety Requirement

Functional Architecture Item



Derived safety requirements

Safety Goal

Do not apply brake force unless driver brakes

Functional Requirement

Ensure correct detection of driver brake which by introducing a redundant pedal sensor

Technical Requirement

Introduce 2 independent pedal sensors

Safety goals are top level safety requirements.


They are derived by safety requirements on analysis level.

These analysis level safety requirements are derived by safety requirements on design level.



SAFE Modeling

Functional Safety Concept



On analysis level, the functional safety concept contains the safety requirements derived from the safety goal.

The satisfy relationship traces their fulfillment on horizontal level.

Technical safety concept



ISO26262


3-7 Hazard analysis and risk assessment



3-8 Functional safety concept



4-6 Specification of technical safety requirements




5-6 Specification of hardware safety requirements

6-6 Specification of software safety requirements

Specification of the technical safety requirements and their allocation to system elements for implementation by the system design.

SAFE – Technical safety concept





ISO26262

3-7 Hazard analysis and risk assessment

3-8 Functional safety concept

4-6 Specification of technical safety requirements

5-6 Specification of hardware safety requirements

6-6 Specification of software safety requirements

SAFE – Architecture modeling

Technical Safety Requirement

Technical Architecture Item

HW Safety Requirement

SW Safety Requirement

HW

SW

HW – SW Interface Specification


HW Architecture Item

SW Architecture Item




SAFE Modeling

Safety Goal Fulfillment



These views show the safety requirements tracing tree. The satisfying architecture elements are shown as leaves of the tree.




In case a safety requirement is satisfied, it is shown in green text color, otherwise in red text color.

Content

- **Open Meta-model**
 - Scope
 - **Structure**
 - Exemplified insight

SAFE Modeling Scope









- SAFE Meta-Model completes automotive architecture languages




SAFE Modeling

From Requirement to AUTOSAR

Model Based Development



Safety Analysis




SAFE Modeling EAST-ADL Technology


- EAST-ADL Association
 - synchronize further refinement of the language
 - provide an entry point for EAST-ADL information
- EATOP: EAST-ADL Tool Platform
 - Modelling infrastructure
 - Plugins for analysis and synthesis
 - Eclipse project eclipse.org/eatop
- LinkedIn Group

 [EASTADL](https://www.linkedin.com/company/eastadl)


EAST-ADL
WWW.EAST-ADL.INFO



Summary: Scope of SAFE Meta-Model



Summary: Scope of SAFE Meta-Model



Content


- **Open Meta-model**
 - Scope
 - Structure
 - **Exemplified insight**

How to react on a possible malfunction



- Tactic is a formalization for defining the role a given requirement has regarding error management.
- Tactic is defined in two steps
 1. Describe in a safety requirement what should not happen
 2. Define how to react if the malfunction happens nonetheless

Tactic to react on a possible malfunction



SAFE Modeling



Library of pre-defined tactics

Tactics on function level

- Warning and degradation concept

Tactics on SW level

- Aliveness Monitor
- Actuator Monitor
- CRC Checksum
- Comparison
- Context Range Check
- Cpu Self Test
- Filter
- Gradient Check
- Health Monitor
- Hearbeat
- Memory Self Test
- Voting





SAFE created a DSL for the safety perspective



No seamless modeling:

- There is no unique DSL that covers all abstraction levels and all perspectives!



Limited usability

- The automotive DSLs (EAST-ADL, AUTOSAR, SAFE) are heavy!



Automatism still not sufficient

- Automatic model to model transformation and code generation is a key for handling the models

Thank you for your attention